Joseph maggio chicago

Chief Judge Johnson also found substantial compliance in all respects with Rule The court had received an affirmative reply to its query of Maggio on whether he concurred in the plea motion. The factual basis of the plea was known to the court through the presentence report, as well as the court's previous presiding over Maggio's first trial where Maggio was convicted of all eight counts.

The first trial also provided Maggio with an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and with an appreciation of the elements of the crime, the court found. Thus, the court concluded that Maggio's plea was voluntary and with full knowledge of the circumstances.

Regarding the requirements of Bryan, the district court held that its failure to comply with that opinion fully was not a basis for setting aside the plea. The trial court viewed Bryan as imposing requirements only on those district courts in the Fifth Circuit which allowed plea bargaining regarding the sentence to be imposed, but not as requiring a court to allow such a bargain. The court concluded that as far as necessary when such bargaining was not allowed, it had complied with Bryan.

Maggio asserts these same three grounds for reversal on this appeal. First, the guilty plea is void because the district court failed to comply with the strict requirements of Rule 11, F. Second, the guilty plea is void because, based on an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, Maggio did not understand the consequences of his plea at the time it was given. Finally, the guilty plea is void because of the trial court's failure to comply with the specific mandate of the en banc decision of this Court in Bryan v.

United States. Defendant's first contention that the district court failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Rule 11, F. Rule 11 prohibits the court from accepting a guilty plea "without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.

McCarthy v. United States, U. The Supreme Court, acting under its supervisory power in McCarthy, created an "automatic prejudice" rule to be applied whenever a guilty plea is accepted by a district court without meticulous adherence to the procedures dictated by Rule 11, which prejudice generally entitles the defendant to an opportunity to plead anew if the issue is raised on direct appeal.

See, e. Davis, F. Bethany, F. Blair, F. But the Supreme Court refused to establish any general guidelines of necessary procedures other than those expressed in the Rule itself, noting that the nature of the inquiry required by Rule 11 must necessarily vary from case to case with matters of reality, and not mere ritual, to control. We think the record affirmatively shows that Rule 11 was substantially complied with in this case. The district judge who presided at defendant's guilty plea was the same district judge who had presided over Maggio's previous jury trial on the same indictment.

At that trial, which Maggio attended, the Government presented all of its evidence against Maggio, disclosing the facts upon which the charges were brought. The defendant heard the district court charge the jury fully on the law upon which the indictment was based, and the relationship between the law and the facts.

Twelve jurors then found Maggio guilty of all eight counts in the indictment, including the one to which he subsequently pled guilty. These convictions were reversed by this Court, not because of any lack of sufficiency of the evidence or confusion at the trial as to "the nature of the charge," but on a technical evidentiary ruling involving an improper predicate for receiving into evidence telephone company records.

At the plea taking session the district judge had personal knowledge of the previous trial, Maggio's presence at that trial, and the jury's conclusion that Maggio was guilty of the count to which the plea was directed. Under such a circumstance, the district court was justified in determining that Maggio understood the nature of the charge, without going through a ritualistic procedure that is necessary in the average case.

The same circumstances fulfilled the requirement that the court "be satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea," which is another requirement of Rule We therefore conclude that the requirements of Rule 11 were adequately met under the facts of this case. It is axiomatic that a guilty plea is invalid unless voluntarily given by a defendant with a full understanding of the possible consequences of the plea.

The Rule 11 provision that a defendant must be shown to understand "the consequences of his plea" does not mean that he must know the sentence that he will receive. Ruiz v. It merely means that he must understand the length of sentence and amount of fine he might possibly receive. Maggio clearly had this understanding.

He had previously received a three-year sentence on this same count, voided by the reversal of his conviction. There was discussion in his presence between the attorneys and the court at the plea taking session as to the exact count of the eight charged in the indictment to which he was pleading, and the maximum sentence allowed.

The court directly addressed the defendant, stating " carries a maximum punishment of not more than one thousand dollars or five years in the penitentiary or both. Maggio asserts, and the district court found, that he truly believed that he would get no more than four months incarceration and that he probably would get only probation with no jail sentence.

Since he did not believe that his probable sentence would be as severe as the two years incarceration he received, Maggio contends that his guilty plea was made without actually "knowing" of the consequence. The courts have consistently held that the subjective belief of a defendant as to the amount of sentence that will be imposed, or the hope for leniency, unsupported by any promises from the Government or indications from the court, is insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea as unknowing or involuntary.

Battle, F. Curtis v. Zelker, F. Page, F. Boles, F. Frontero, F. The information provided to Maggio and his attorney by the United States made the position of the Government clear: The district court would not allow the Government to make a recommendation because this might imply that the court would accept it, when in fact the court was at liberty to ignore the recommendation entirely.

Hernandez-Salazar, F. Walsh told this to Maggio, and the court made it clear at the time it accepted the plea what maximum sentence could be imposed.

In the face of these uncontroverted facts the trial court found Maggio's plea to have been voluntary. We cannot hold that finding to be clearly erroneous. See Holland v. We are thus brought face to face with this issue: does the failure of the district court to comply strictly with Bryan requirements necessitate vacation of a guilty plea in the absence of a showing of prejudice?

We hold it does not, but point out the legal and judicial effort that has been required because of such noncompliance in this case. In the first place, as we later develop, the district court was wrong in considering Bryan inapplicable to its practice. Although the court would not accept recommendations as to sentence, it did recognize bargains as to the dropping of charges.

To this extent then, at least, it should have had defendant under oath, and advised that such bargains were permissible. Permitting some bargains but refusing others means that the court should directly advise which bargains are not permissible, in order to give a clear record of the plea-taking negotiations and process and to foreclose the kind of evidentiary hearing and full-scale appeal that was required in this case.

This Court's en banc decision in Bryan v. In our supervisory capacity we established the minimum procedures we considered to be commensurate with both the letter and spirit of Rule 11, F. Photos Works. Main Photo Add photo. School period Add photo. Career Add photo. Achievements Add photo. Membership Add photo. Awards Add photo. Other Photos Add photo. Other photo of Rosalie Maggio. Connections Add photo. For anyone who has ever stared at a blank page or screen Quotations from Women on Life Compiles quotations by women on such subjects as life, be The music box Christmas Despite his grandmother's recent death and the return of She was A Human Rights Campaign report showed that, in , a record 44 transgender, nonbinary or gender-nonconforming In a statement entitled "The Giant Sleeps," the Unity Mazer was born May 10, Celebration of life for Roman Buenrostro taking place Oct.

Dearborn St. Pooh was found shot to death inside a car early in the morning on August 23, Goodman was born in a Jewish family, This Court's en banc decision in Bryan v.

In our supervisory capacity we established the minimum procedures we considered to be commensurate with both the letter and spirit of Rule 11, F.

New York, U. The Bryan supplementary procedure is similar to that which would be required by the proposed revision to Rule 11 which is presently awaiting Congressional action. Compare Bryan v. Bryan requires 1 that the defendant be placed under oath at the time of taking his guilty plea, 2 that the district court shall state that plea agreements are permissible and that the defendant and all counsel have a duty to disclose the existence and details of any agreement which relates to the plea tendered, and 3 that specific inquiry be made as to the existence of such an agreement before a plea is accepted.

This case demonstrates the type of problems which can arise when the trial court does not make clear to the defendant the court's position regarding agreements between the prosecutor and the defendant. Maggio was told that the judge would not allow a sentence recommendation "in open court," and from this he surmised, incorrectly, that certain "behind the scenes" contact would be possible.

As a consequence, he did not believe that the maximum possible sentence stated by the judge at the plea session was truly a possibility. Maggio's confusion could have been obviated had the Bryan procedure been adopted to the plea session in this case. As it is, we are once again confronted with a defendant expecting "secret" contacts and consequently, mired in a peripheral matter such as we had hoped to avoid by our decision in Bryan. Chief Judge Johnson does not participate in plea negotiations and will not accept sentence recommendations from the United States Attorney when a guilty plea is tendered.

The court's apparent reason for foreclosing this option is to avoid suggesting to the accused what sentence actually will be imposed if he pleads guilty. Sentencing is ordinarily solely within the discretion of the trial court, which may accept, reject or ignore any prosecutorial recommendation, if one is given. The prosecutor may not, therefore, properly promise any defendant that he will receive a certain sentence if he pleads guilty to a charge.

The United States Attorney does have the authority, generally, to make a recommendation regarding sentence, and it is the defendant's belief that such a recommendation will be considered by the sentencing court that makes such a recommendation a potential quid pro quo in plea negotiations. On the other hand, a recommendation to any court that does not plan to follow it or give it consideration may well mislead the defendant.

The district judge in this case, for example, would not consider any prosecutorial sentence recommendation in setting the sentence, instead making his own independent judgment of the appropriate sentence. The court recognized that to mislead the defendant by permitting prosecutorial recommendations could, in some circumstances, adversely affect the voluntariness of the plea, even though the plea bargain would have been unquestionably kept. Under the circumstance of this case, neither the Government nor the defendant has suffered any loss when the court merely refuses to allow the prosecutor to suggest a sentence, which suggestion the court intends totally to disregard.

Apparently at the time the plea was accepted the trial court below viewed Bryan as applying only either to plea sessions wherein the Government was to give a sentence recommendation or to plea sessions involving an agreement where the judge had taken an active role in the negotiation of its terms.

This Court noted sometime ago that a variety of reasons support a trial judge's refusal to participate in plea discussions.

Brown v. Beto, F. Since Bryan could not be limited only to situations involving a practice which has been disapproved, the district court must have considered Bryan limited to plea agreements involving a plea recommendation, such as the one in Bryan itself. This reads the Bryan opinion too narrowly. The holding on the merits of the defendant's claim in Bryan was of necessity directed to a situation involving a sentence which the defendant anticipated to be imposed, as that was the factual setting of that case.

But Part II of the opinion, on which the en banc court was unanimous, was intended to apply to all district courts in the Fifth Circuit and not just to those which accept sentence recommendations.

Bryan was not meant to create an immutable litany applicable only in factual settings similar to its own. An agreement reached after "plea bargaining" may encompass much more than the prosecutor's agreeing to recommend a particular sentence to the sentencing judge.

See Swanson v. Estelle, F. As in this case, it may entail a defendant pleading guilty to one count in exchange for the prosecutor's dropping other counts. United States v. Cawley, F. Vale, F. A defendant may plead guilty in exchange for the Government's dropping an enhancement provision in the indictment.

Swanson v. A guilty plea may be entered by a defendant to a lesser included offense in order to limit the maximum possible sentence which he might receive. Ammidown, U. The Government might exchange dropped counts for information which the defendant agrees to provide. Owen, F. There are numerous other variations. Ross, F. Hamilton, F. Only one option normally available for offering by the prosecutor, a sentence recommendation by the prosecutor to the sentencing court, was apparently foreclosed by the trial court in this case.

Wainwright, F. Primary responsibility for the administration of each of the numerous components of these various plea bargains does not necessarily rest with the district court. Where the prosecutor has primary responsibility for the administration of a particular element of our system of justice, the district court's role becomes secondary and complementary to that of the prosecutor. For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit views the district court's authority to restrict or reject certain types of plea bargains as being limited to insuring that the United States Attorney has not abused the discretion which is inherent in the prosecutorial position.

Ammidown contains the most extensive judicial discussion we have found concerning the roles of the prosecutor and the court in the plea bargaining scenario. This Court has also addressed the question to a limited extent. For example, we have held that once Rule 11 has been satisfied, and a reasonable effort must be made to satisfy it, a district judge cannot refuse a negotiated guilty plea except for "good cause.

Martinez, F. Finding good cause absent in Martinez, this Court allowed the defendant to enforce such an agreement after the judge had refused his guilty plea and even after the defendant had been convicted of the counts which the Government had originally agreed to dismiss. When Martinez is viewed in conjunction with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it suggests that the district court may not prohibit all plea negotiations between the prosecutor and the defendant.

Martinez in effect gives a defendant a conditional right to have his guilty plea accepted, while Rule 48 a , F. Although the dismissal requires leave of the court, the court cannot refuse the dismissal except in limited circumstances. Combined, these legal authorities suggest that the district court may not issue a blanket proscription of plea agreements of the kind where the prosecution drops some charges in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea to other charges.

This was the only type of plea bargain which was reached in this case, and the district court properly accepted it. In spite of the district court's recognition of plea agreements, at least to a certain extent, it believed that Bryan did not apply. At the hearing on the motion to vacate Maggio's sentence, the court addressed itself to the Bryan contention:. The fact that the Court did not state, and I mention this because it is in the motion, that pre-arrangements are permissible, that Bryan requires that, I don't think that Bryan requires that the Court that doesn't allow pre-arrangements to state that.

It does not constitute a basis for setting a plea and a sentence aside.